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Introduction 
Income inequality has long been regarded as an unintended effect of development which 
is mainly caused by failure of the government and market system in distributing the 
development’s benefits equally among people (Le Grand 1991, pp. 427-428). Examining 
the government’s side, Sen (1999) argues that inequality reflects the inability of 
government’s redistribution function along with the breakdown of the social welfare 
function (pp. 360-362). From the market side, Weeden and Grusky (2014) argue that 
inequality is mainly derived by the presence of institutional barriers that obstruct capital 
or labour to flow freely (p. 473). Since income inequality is mainly caused by the 
difference in ability and opportunity among people to capture income as a benefit of the 
development, therefore policies in addressing inequality should be focused on 
redistributing income. Social policy and its characters of redistribution, regulatory and 
rights (Deacon 2007, p. 4) could be one of policy options for income redistribution 
purposes. Against this background, this essay will examine the opportunity of social 
policies to become effective means of reducing inequalities. By analyzing different 
targeted cash transfer programs implemented by Brazil and Malawi based on relevant 
literature, this paper argues that social policies are an effective means to reduce inequality.  
Literature review: social policies as income redistribution instruments 
Social policies could become the effective redistributive instruments in addressing 
income inequality. According to Deacon (2007), social policy provides an alternative 
redistribution mechanism in which the government could possibly distribute the outcome 
of economic activity more evenly to the people (p. 4). Another instrument to redistribute 
income is taxes, however, according to Prasad (2008) heavy reliance on taxes in 
redistributing income will drive to high taxes that could potentially discourage and distort 
economic activity as well as burdening the poor through indirect taxes (p. 6). In addition, 
evidence from developed countries shows that countries which focus on social policies 
rather than taxes policy in distributing income have managed to achieve lower inequality 
(ibid, p. 13).  
On the other hand, focusing policies only on economic growth cannot ensure that the 
growth’s benefits are distributed equally. The role of economic growth is important to 
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generate additional resources that enable countries to develop and improve their citizen’s 
wellbeing and prosperity. However, to be effective in addressing inequality, economic 
growth must be inclusive, which means creating an opportunity for people to contribute 
to economic activities and to access the benefits of growth (OECD 2014, p. 3; World 
Bank 2005, pp. 1-2). According to Haan (2013), to be inclusive, economic growth 
requires an incorporated social policy to ascertain that wealth as a result of growth is 
equitably accessed by people (p. 15). Likewise, social policies are required for social 
development purposes. Since the main goal of social development is to empower people 
by transforming formal and informal institutions that influence the quality of economic 
growth, public service delivery and human development (World Bank 2005, pp. 1-2), 
social policies could play role in promoting strategy of people empowerment through its 
ability to bring in the poor and the low income in the development process. Therefore, to 
be able effectively reducing inequality, both economic growth and social development 
strategies necessitate social policies as the main complementary factor.    
Analysis: Analysing Brazil’s Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) and Malawi’s 
Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs) 
This section will discuss the strengths and weaknesses as well as benefits and costs of 
social policies implemented by Brazil and Malawi in reducing inequalities. The main 
reason of selecting these countries are because firstly, both Brazil and Malawi have 
experienced a decline in inequality significantly over the last two decades, shown by a 
decrease in the Gini index by 7.4 and 6.4 percentage points respectively (Tsounta & 
Osueke 2014, p. 9). Secondly, while contemporary social protection is highlighted by 
growing and successful CCTs as many countries, including Brazil, have done (Fiszbein 
& Schady 2009, pp. 3-5), Malawi consistently implements UCTs as its main social policy 
since 2006 (Miller et al. 2010, p. 110). Therefore, it is important to comprehend the 
factors which affect and are affected these different cash transfer programs in decreasing 
inequality. 
For poverty reduction purposes, targeted cash transfer is an appropriate strategy in 
combating chronic poverty. Since the chronically poor experience accumulative 
deprivation of basic capabilities that leads to difficulties in escaping themselves from this 
condition, providing basic needs or cash to access basic needs for them is appropriate 
(Hulme & Shepherd 2003, p. 407; Hulme et al. 2001 pp. 6-7). The main advantage of 
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cash transfer programs, according to Hailu and Soares (2008), is their ability to alleviate 
poverty in the short term because additional income is given directly to the poor (p. 3). 
Both Brazil and Malawi suffered a chronic poverty problem prior to the implementation 
of the cash transfer program. For example, Ribas and Machado (2007) report that in 2003 
when the Bolsa Familia (BP) was introduced, about 73 percent of relative poverty in 
Brazil was chronic (p. 18). While in Malawi, when the Social Cash Transfer Programme 
(SCTP) was firstly introduced in 2009, Miller et al. (2010) report that most of poor 
households were in chronic poverty (p. 110). Even though current data of chronic poverty 
for both countries is unavailable, the decreasing trend in poverty headcount ratio in both 
countries could be evidence of the contribution of the targeted cash transfer program in 
poverty reduction. In Brazil, poverty headcount ratio decreased from 17.3 percent in 2006 
to 7.4 percent in 2014 (World Bank 2016), while in Malawi, the UNDP (2016) reports 
that poverty headcount is in a declining trend from 50 percent in 2005 to 39 percent in 
2010. 
In regards to income inequality, the main strength of CCTs is the ability to direct the 
beneficiaries to use the additional income for productive purposes such as education and 
health, therefore CCTs raise an opportunity to decrease income inequality sustainably. 
According to the UNDP (2013), as redistributive instrument, CCTs contribute in 
decreasing inequality through two steps, first, CCTs provide targeted households with a 
minimum of income needed for investing in human capital, and second, in the longer 
term, more healthy and educated people are expected to gain capabilities to be involved 
in income-generation activities (p. 239). In the case of Brazil, Bolsa Familia targets the 
poor and very poor households as beneficiaries in which their per-capita income below 
US$73 and US$36 respectively (Hall 2008, pp. 805-806). This program provides monthly 
monetary incentive up to US$104 per family which is conditional upon educational and 
health activities such as regular school presence and number of visits to health services 
(ibid). The conditionality of the program on educational and health activities clearly 
shows that Brazil has a strong commitment in human capital investment that could be an 
essential factor in boosting targeted citizen’s income.  
However, since CCTs are mainly intended to enhance targeted beneficiaries from the 
demand side on specific outcomes such as health and education, CCTs require 
complementary policies and additional spending on the supply side. To be successful, 
according to the IMF (2014), the CCTs entail the government to invest on the supply side, 
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for example by improving educational system and facilities (p. 32), therefore the costs in 
implementing CCTs will be higher since the government has to manage both demand and 
supply side. In addition, CCTs require high administrative capacity to ensure that the 
beneficiaries comply upon conditionality, and could potentially result in additional cost 
for the government. In the case of Bolsa Familia, one of its success factors is the strong 
administrative capacity in which the government created a centralized administrative 
structure at the initial stage of the program by establishing the Ministry of Social 
Development and Fight against Hunger to facilitate integration and co-ordination (Hall 
2008, p. 805).  
On the other hand, providing cash transfers unconditionally could broaden the spending 
options for beneficiaries and could potentially decrease inequality since it creates a direct 
connection between income redistribution and basic human needs. According to the 
UNRISD (2010), the conditionality of cash transfers sometimes do not necessarily result 
in expected outcomes, therefore unconditional and categorical cash transfers could 
potentially enhance people capabilities to chase a better and sustainable livelihood (p. 
17). In addition, Lustig et al. (2014) argue that the redistributive character of targeted cash 
transfer program is progressive towards inequality, no matter if it is conditional or 
unconditional (pp. 287-288).  Even though UCTs are mainly intended to enhance and 
smooth consumption of basic needs especially food (Slater 2011, p. 251) there is some 
evidence from Africa’s countries that beneficiaries of UCTs utilize additional income for 
educational and health purposes indicated by an increase in child schooling and health 
outcomes (Edmonds 2006, p. 412; Case et al. 2005, p. 480).  
Furthermore, compared to CCTs, the UCTs need less administrative costs since they do 
not require any condition that need to be monitored. Even though strong administrative 
capacity is still needed for managing data of beneficiaries, UCTs could involve 
community in better targeting the beneficiaries and increasing productivity of money 
utilization. In the case of Malawi, the SCTP provides monthly monetary support up to 
US$12.85 to about 300,000 ultra-poor households (Miller et al., 2010, pp. 110-111). In 
implementing the program, the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social as program 
administrator involves voluntary committees namely the Community Social Support 
Committees which comprises of literate community members elected by the community 
to (1) conduct targeting activities through community meeting, and (2) guide beneficiaries 
to better use of the cash transfer (IPC-IG 2015, p. 1). Accordingly, responsibilities given 
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to the community by the administrator could increase effectiveness of the program since 
it will gain a strong ownership and legitimacy. According to Vigoda (2002), it is 
important to bring in communities into the implementation of a public program by sharing 
the responsibilities because as they become a part of responsible parties, their sense of 
ownership will be stronger and their commitment in attaining public goals will be higher 
(p. 529). 
Even though there is some evidence that shows that UCT beneficiaries also spend the 
cash transfers in productive manner, possibility of misuse of the cash for non-basic needs 
items, such as cigarettes and alcohol, is higher for UCTs than CCTs, since UCTs do not 
create any restriction for beneficiaries to spend their money. Evan and Popova (2014) 
argue that UCTs have to be accompanied by a strong message to encourage beneficiaries 
to spend the cash on basic needs, to invest in children education or to increase health 
outcomes (p. 4). The SCTP’s administrator in Malawi has anticipated this weakness of 
UCTs by involving the Community Social Support Committees (CSSC) to promote better 
spending to beneficiaries. Accordingly, IPC-IG (2015) reveals that the CSSC is the 
determinant factor to the success of SCTP and suggests for Malawi’s government to 
strengthen these committees by material and technical support (p. 1).  
Since both CCTs and UCTs implemented by Brazil and Malawi are targeted programs, 
the process in determining the targeted beneficiaries could be the most crucial steps in 
program implementation. Inaccurate targets could potentially hamper the goals of the 
program and lead the program to be ineffective and inefficient. According to Slater 
(2011), better targeting increases the effectiveness and efficiency of the program because 
it limits the use of government money only to the intended groups and avoids 
misallocation to the unintended beneficiaries (p. 253). For instance, criteria of ultra-poor 
households as targeted beneficiaries of the Malawi’s SCTP are (1) households which are 
unable to meet the most basic urgent needs such as food and clothing, and (2) labour 
constrained households due to the age, disability of chronic illness of household members 
(Miller et al., 2010, pp. 110-111). Likewise, targeted beneficiaries of the Brazil’s Bolsa 
Familia is defined by establishing the maximum per-capita income of the poor and very 
poor by US$73 and US$36 respectively (Hall 2008, pp. 805-806). Once the criteria of 
targeted beneficiaries has been established, it is essential for program administrator to 
ensure and monitor regularly that condition of targeted beneficiaries are within the 
criteria. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, social policies could become the effective strategy in addressing inequality 
since they are able to promote better income redistribution mechanism rather than taxes 
policy. Redistributive character of social policies could be an essential complement to 
economic growth strategy to be inclusive, and support development strategy to better 
empowering people. Among other social policies, targeted cash transfers could be the 
strongest instrument in combating poverty and income inequality since they target the 
lowest income people in the society as beneficiaries of redistributed income. Even though 
both of the unconditional and conditional cash transfer programs are progressive towards 
inequality, the nature of a conditional cash transfer that requires conditionality upon 
human development aspects leads to an opportunity to decrease inequality in sustainable 
manner. A well-targeted cash transfer program, both unconditional and conditional, 
presupposes a strong administrative capacity to ensure that the data of targeted 
beneficiaries is accurate and updated regularly, therefore it requires the government to 
establish and develop a strong institutional capacity to manage the program. Involving 
communities in implementing unconditional cash transfers could potentially strengthen 
the program by increasing targeting quality and promoting better spending.  
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